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Abstract
How do people form expectations about the future? We use amateur and expert
investors' expectations about financial asset prices to study this question. Three
experiments contrast the rational expectations assumption from neoclassical eco-
nomics (investors forecast according to neoclassical financial theory) against two
psychological theories of expectation formation—behaviorally informed expectations
(investors understand empirical market anomalies and expect these anomalies to
occur) and narrative expectations (investors use narrative thinking to predict future
prices). Whereas neoclassical financial theory maintains that past public information
cannot be used to predict future prices, participants used company performance
information revealed before a base price quotation to project future price trends
after that quotation (Experiment 1), contradicting rational expectations. Impor-
tantly, these projections were stronger when information concerned predictions
about a company's future performance rather than actual data about its past
performance, suggesting that people not only rely on financially irrelevant (but
narratively relevant) information for making predictions but erroneously impose
temporal order on that information. These biased predictions had downstream
consequences for asset allocation choices (Experiment 2), and these choices were
driven in part by affective reactions to the company performance news
(Experiment 3). There were some mild effects of expertise, but overall the effects
of narrative appear to be consistent across all levels of expertise studied, including
professional financial analysts. We conclude by discussing the prospects for a
narrative theory of choice that provide new microfoundational insights about eco-
nomic behavior.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Our expectations shape our choices. We purchase products we
expect to enjoy; go to universities we expect to benefit our careers;
and marry who we expect to make us happy. In many domains of life,
we aim to buy low and to sell high. This insight is a cornerstone of
economics and helps to provide a bridge between our beliefs and our
behavior (e.g., Friedman, 1957; Lachmann, 1943).
The best-known conception of expectations in economics is the
rational expectations assumption (Lucas, 1972; Muth, 1961). This
assumption simply states that the agents in an economic model are
“rational,” in the sense that they share the same assumptions as the
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modelers. For example, when predicting future stock prices, rational
economic agents in a standard financial model would understand that
stock prices take a random walk. This assumption has long been criti-
cized directly (Davidson, 1982; Haltiwanger & Waldman, 1985;
Lovell, 1986; Simon, 1979), whereas the broader behavioral econom-
ics revolution provides an indirect critique. But less work has experi-
mentally contrasted theories of how people form expectations
(cf., Adam, 2007; Copeland & Friedman, 1987; Harvey et al., 1994;
Hommes, 2011; Plott & Sunder, 1982; Smith et al., 1988). Here, we
test amateur and experienced investors' predictions about stock
prices. We contrast rational expectations with two alternative, psy-
chologically motivated theories of price expectations—expectations
based on stock market anomalies (behaviorally informed expectations)
or based on narrative thinking (narrative expectations).
2 | MAKING SENSE OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS
Humans may have an intrinsic tendency to “truck, barter, and
exchange” real goods and services (Smith, 1776; see Chen
et al., 2006), but aspects of the experience trading financial assets are
psychologically challenging (Tuckett, 2011). First, such assets
appeared as recently as an evolutionary eyeblink. To the extent that
we have adapted intuitions for trade, they would be adapted for bar-
ter, not sales of financial assets (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; but see
Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2020). Second, these assets are highly
abstract, such as streams of future dividends or bundles of loans.
Unlike traded consumer goods, financial assets often have no worth
beyond what they can be traded for. Third, the value of a financial
asset depends not on the value of the underlying asset as such, but on
what other people believe this value is. As Keynes (1936) put it, the
market is like a beauty contest wherein the goal is not assessing the
beauty of the contestants, but predicting the other judges' scores.
Fourth, traders in financial assets receive extremely noisy feedback
given market volatility. Despite economists' insistence that stock
prices follow a random walk and are essentially unpredictable, numer-
ous manuals in “technical trading” fill the shelves of bookshops, prom-
ising to help investors to detect patterns in overwhelming noise.
Finally, posing the greatest difficulty of all, financial decisions are
often made under Knightian or radical uncertainty (Knight, 1921;
Mises, 1949) with no principled way to assign probabilities to possible
outcomes: What is the probability that a technical innovation can be
accomplished on time, that consumers will have the taste for a new
product, or that an economic downturn will tighten consumer
spending?
We argue here that people circumvent these limited intuitions by
using narrative thinking to understand financial assets, influencing
forecasts of asset values and subsequent choices. Narratives are one
way we satisfy our drive to understand the world (Bruner, 1990;
Chater & Loewenstein, 2016). Storytelling is cross-culturally universal
(Brown, 1991; Hogan, 2003), emerging early in child development
(Applebee, 1978) and human history (Abbott, 2000). Stories appear to
powerfully shape our cognition (Gottschall, 2012), pervading our
memories (Bartlett, 1932; Mandler et al., 1980; Schank &
Abelson, 1977) and imbuing our lives with meaning (McAdams, 1993).
Given our facility for storytelling, compared with the obscurity of
finance, several thinkers have proposed that storytelling influences
economic behavior. Taleb (2001) has argued that people are “fooled
by randomness,” committing a narrative fallacy in which they confabu-
late narrative explanations for random phenomena (Taleb, 2007).
Nobel laureates Robert Shiller and George Akerlof have suggested
that powerful stories capture the public's imagination in times of
mania and panic, generating feedback loops that create bubbles and
busts (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009; Shiller, 2000, 2017).
Empirical support for these proposals is incomplete, but existing
evidence is suggestive. First, narrative thinking influences decision-
making broadly. Juries are more swayed when the same witness testi-
mony is arranged to tell a story (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Similarly,
consumers respond more strongly to information presented in a narra-
tive rather than list form (Adaval & Wyer, 1998), form stronger con-
nections to brands presented through narrative (Escalas, 2004), and
adjust their attitudes and intentions when they get “lost” in a story
(Van Laer et al., 2014).
Second, research on forecasting suggests that people use narra-
tives to predict future events (Beach, 2020; Lawrence et al., 2006).
For example, forecasters extrapolate from past trends and act on
these extrapolations (De Bondt, 1993; Harvey et al., 1994; Hommes
et al., 2008), perhaps because they expect existing causal forces to
persist; indeed, later studies found that participants impose more
sophisticated patterns on data rather than mere linear extrapolation
(Johnson, Matiashvili, & Tuckett, 2019a). More directly, people incor-
porate causal information in their forecasts (Lim & O'Connor, 1996),
particularly information about internal (rather than external) features
of the firms (Johnson, Matiashvili, & Tuckett, 2019b). Forecasters
often rely on “scenarios” of causally linked events to simplify predic-
tions (Godet, 1982), with scenarios being particularly persuasive
(Önkal et al., 2013) and explanations making users less likely to adjust
forecasts (Gönül et al., 2009). Scenario thinking can not only open up
forecasters to new possibilities but can also lead to bias. In many
domains, including economic prediction, people often make predic-
tions that account for only the most likely scenario, rather than taking
account of multiple possibilities (Johnson, Merchant, & Keil, 2020;
Murphy & Ross, 1994; but see Chen et al., 2014; Johnson, Murphy,
et al., 2019). For example, when people believe that there is a 70%
probability that the government will loosen fiscal policy (but a 30%
probability against), they make forecasts as though there is a 100%
probability of looser fiscal policy (Johnson & Hill, 2017). Indeed,
merely imagining a scenario to be true increases judgments that it is
true (Koehler, 1991). In line with these findings, Beach (2020) has
argued that conceptualizing scenarios as narratives makes sense of a
variety of forecasting biases, although relatively little work has directly
investigated forecasting through a narrative lens.
Finally, although not experimental, interviews with professional
money managers (Tuckett, 2011, 2012) support the idea that profes-
sional investors rely largely on narratives to make decisions.
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Institutional investors face massive amounts of information and must
filter out a minuscule fraction to inform their decision-making. These
investors routinely make judgments not only about accounting data
but also about managers' abilities and intentions, the choices of gov-
ernments, the outlook for the economy, and the whims of consumers.
In situations of such profound uncertainty, what choice do investors
have but to make their best guess as to what story best fits the facts?
Despite this suggestive evidence, few experiments have directly
pitted narrative accounts of financial forecasting against other
descriptive theories. Forecasting financial asset prices is different
from many forecasting tasks more commonly studied in the
literature—such as forecasting sales or earnings—in that stock prices
are thought to be fundamentally unpredictable. That is, whereas even
novices can outperform statistical forecasts in some domains
(Lawrence et al., 1985), expertise not only does not seem to help but
can even hurt in financial forecasting (Yates et al., 1991). In fact, there
is little evidence that there is skill in predicting financial asset prices:
Money managers' performance varies randomly rather than systemati-
cally from year to year and few if any funds systematically outperform
market returns (Jensen, 1968; Wermers, 2011). Although traders cer-
tainly believe there is some predictability in stock prices (otherwise
they would not trade them!), many investors may well be aware of the
exceptionally low signal-to-noise ratio in financial forecasting.
Whether people use narratives in financial forecasting is therefore
important to understand for finance research, given the profound dif-
ferences between financial forecasting and other forecasting tasks.
Moreover, few studies have examined how narratives shape forecast-
ing in general, making financial forecasting a potentially useful case
study. For example, Önkal et al. (2013) study the effects of providing
scenarios to forecasters, whereas we are primarily interested in the
cues people use to impose narratives to structure information. That is,
we ask whether and how people convert information into narrative
mental representations that facilitate forecasting (Szollosi &
Newell, 2020). Studying narrative thinking may thus be useful for
understanding the psychological mechanisms underlying scenario-
based forecasting (Beach, 2020).
3 | THREE THEORIES OF EXPECTATIONS
Here, we study layperson investors' reactions to news about compa-
nies' performance. This is a rich domain for contrasting theories of
financial decision-making, because news announcements have previ-
ously been studied in detail by financial economists and because plau-
sible theories of investor behavior make sharply divergent predictions.
The core question we ask is how investors predict (and act on the pre-
diction of) companies' stock prices given either positive or negative
news and whether these predictions and choices differ in strength
depending on whether the news concerns the company's past quarter
performance or estimates of the company's next quarter performance.
We contrast the hypothesis that investors form narrative expectations
from the more orthodox hypotheses that investors form rational
expectations or behaviorally informed expectations.
3.1 | Rational expectations
The rational expectations assumption is a centerpiece of neoclassical
economics (Lucas, 1972; Muth, 1961). It holds that the agents in an
economic theory form expectations of the future that are consistent
with the theory in which they find themselves. In other words, agents
in a neoclassical economic theory predict the future using neoclassical
economic theory. Thus, to understand the predictions of the rational
expectations account, we need to understand what neoclassical eco-
nomics says about price movements following news announcements.
According to financial theory, stock prices are the market's best
guess as to the security's stream of future dividends, discounted to
reflect the fact that these dividend payments will occur in the future
(Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Stock prices change as new information is
revealed that is relevant to determining the company's future value.
However, unless an investor has access to information that is not pub-
lic, she can do no better than chance at predicting future price move-
ments: That is, stock prices take a random walk (Fama, 1965). This
follows from the logic of arbitrage. If future stock prices were predict-
able on the basis of publicly available news information, then a “smart
money” arbitrageur would be able to capitalize on this predictability
by buying or selling shares of the stock before the market moved.
Because there are many traders attempting to predict the trajectory
of the market, such arbitrage opportunities last for only a very short
time—especially in a modern financial market with low transaction
costs, near-instantaneous trading, and automated trading algorithms.
Financial theorists have argued from this unpredictability that financial
markets can be efficient in the sense that they incorporate all known
information into security prices (Fama, 1970).
Thus, neoclassical theory predicts that positive or negative corpo-
rate news announcements will be followed rapidly by a shift in the
company's share price and that prices afterward will follow a random
walk from that new price. Therefore, if a share price is quoted after a
news announcement (as in our experiments), investors with rational
expectations would predict that share prices gradually increase over
time at a rate reflecting the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital—
that is, at roughly the historical rate for a stock of equivalent risk
(Brealey et al., 2013). The nature of the announcement is irrelevant
to future share prices because all publicly available information is
already embedded in the share price. This is true whether the
announcement is positive or negative relative to previous expecta-
tions and whether it concerns actual past performance or predicted
future performance.
3.2 | Behaviorally informed expectations
An individual investor really would be hard-pressed to make predic-
tions or choices that improve over the predictions of the efficient
market hypothesis. Nonetheless, a variety of anomalies have been
detected in stock price data, which, though modest in magnitude, con-
stitute divergences from strictly efficient markets (Shefrin, 2002).
Might people intuit these divergences and thereby make predictions
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that are actually more accurate than neoclassically rational
expectations?
Empirically, stock prices do not follow a strict random walk
after earnings announcements. Instead, investors appear to initially
underreact to earnings announcements (Bernard, 1992; Chan
et al., 1996). That is, if a security outperforms expectations, the rapid
increase in share price (predicted by market efficiency) is followed by
a continued upward drift in share prices in the short to medium term
(Bernard, 1992; Bernard & Thomas, 1989, 1990). The converse is seen
when a security underperforms expectations: The initial drop in share
value is followed by an extended downward drift in share prices. Put
differently, earnings announcements trigger a period of short-term
price momentum (Cutler et al., 1991; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993).
Although these abnormal returns (relative to the market rate of
return) are modest in magnitude, they are difficult to explain in a strict
efficient markets framework.
This initial underreaction over short timeframes gives way over
longer tsimeframes to overreaction (Chopra et al., 1992; De Bondt &
Thaler, 1985; Stein, 1989). After a positive performance surprise,
share prices will drift upward in the short to medium term but will
drift back downward afterward. Conversely, after a negative perfor-
mance surprise, share prices will drift downward for a time but drift
back upward afterward. That is, security prices drift too far in this ini-
tial period and adjust back to an equilibrium price afterward so that
the long-run return of the security is no different from the market
overall. What comes up (out of equilibrium) must come down (back to
equilibrium) and vice versa. That is, price momentum is followed by
reversion.
Various models have been proposed to explain this pattern
(Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999), but
there is no consensus. For our purposes, we simply note that agents
with behaviorally informed expectations would anticipate this pattern.
If predicting share prices, relative to a benchmark given after a perfor-
mance surprise, a behaviorally informed investor would predict short-
term abnormal returns, over and above the market rate of return.
(In our studies, we probe for this belief by asking for predictions at a
2-week interval after the announcement.) However, at a longer time
interval, such an investor would predict that the prices should revert
back toward the market rate of return (in our studies, at a 1-year
interval). Although we certainly would not expect amateur investors
to have learned about these patterns from the academic literature, it
may be plausible that investors could intuit them. After all, investors
cause them.
3.3 | Narrative expectations
Although both of the above positions would be in keeping with exis-
ting financial theory, in one way or another, we predicted a different
pattern because we hypothesize that people construct narratives to
make sense of complex systems and guide behavior. Conviction
narrative theory (CNT; Johnson, Bilovich, & Tuckett, 2020; Tuckett &
Nikolic, 2017) is an account of choice under radical uncertainty. CNT
defines narratives functionally as a mental representation that
(i) explains available information, (ii) generates imagined futures, and
(iii) motivates actions; thus, narratives are a subset of a broader cate-
gory of causal models or intuitive theories that can simultaneously
accommodate past evidence and make future predictions. According
to CNT, decision-makers faced with radical uncertainty marshal what-
ever evidence they can to generate a causal narrative to support their
actions, which they extrapolate into the future, conditional on their
potential choices. They then rely on their affective reactions to evalu-
ate that possible future and choose between narratives; they are then
motivated to approach the choice option imagined to bring about the
desired outcome.
CNT differs in several ways from other views on offer. First, it
goes beyond existing notions of causation in forecasting, such as
scenario-based forecasting, by integrating the explanatory, imagina-
tive, and motivational functions of narratives; thus, our approach is
consonant with Beach's (2020) notion of grounding scenario-based
forecasting in narrative thinking. Second, in appealing to recent cogni-
tive science advances in explanatory reasoning (Lombrozo, 2016),
CNT provides a link between the psychology of inference and
decision-making. For example, causal knowledge is organized as causal
mechanism schemata that permit mental simulation of event
sequences (Hegarty, 2004; Johnson & Ahn, 2015)—thus, causal narra-
tives naturally provide a link between past evidence and imagined
futures. Likewise, we typically simulate a single possibility at a time
(Evans, 2007; Johnson, Merchant, & Keil, 2020; Murphy &
Ross, 1994), consistent with the commonsense intuition that stories
follow a discrete sequence of events rather than existing in our minds
as probability distributions. Finally, because narratives are a natural
format for human communication (e.g., Smith et al., 2017), CNT may
be promising for understanding how individual cognition embedded in
a social context leads to “viral” beliefs (Shiller, 2017).
CNT makes many predictions about forecasting, of which we
focus on a subset in this article. To derive these predictions, we reflect
on the signature properties of stories (Bruner, 1990; Graesser
et al., 1994; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Mar & Oatley, 2008;
Rumelhart, 1975). Stories refer to goal-directed activities, which
become emotionally valenced as goals are approached or thwarted.
Stories are temporally oriented, referring to sequences of discrete
events occurring in a particular order. Stories provide causal explana-
tions and rely on a set of schematic patterns to make sense of infor-
mation organized over time. And as noted above, stories occur in
discrete sequences rather than probability distributions.
Here, we restrict ourselves to testing two of these predictions,
concerning the structure of narratives, though we test several other
predictions of CNT elsewhere (Batteux et al., 2020, 2021; Bilovich
et al., 2020; Johnson, Matiashvili, & Tuckett, 2019a, 2019b; Nyman
et al., 2018; see Johnson, Bilovich, & Tuckett, 2020 for a review),
including predictions about narrative content. Here, we examine the
consequences of narratives being goal-oriented and temporally
oriented.
First, stories (like investments) are goal-oriented. Their protago-
nists want to achieve certain objectives and developments in the
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narrative either facilitate or thwart these objectives. Thus, stories take
on an emotional valence as goals become closer or more distant. Just
as memories are often organized around narratives, memories often
take on the emotional tinge of the associated narrative
(Bartlett, 1932; Bower, 1981). If people use narratives to generate
predictions, then they should use the valence of information to inform
their predictions. According to CNT, narratives that generate
approach emotions should be associated with more positive predic-
tions and actions, whereas narratives that generate avoidance emo-
tions should be associated with more negative predictions and
avoidance behaviors (see Bilovich et al., 2020 on how approach
vs. avoidance emotions influence decision confidence). This prediction
is structural in the sense that narratives organized around goal
approach should lead to more positive predictions compared with nar-
ratives in which goals are thwarted. Different attributions for goal
approach (e.g., luck vs. skill) may moderate this effect, but we test this
possibility elsewhere (Johnson, Matiashvili, & Tuckett, 2019b).
Second, stories are temporally oriented (Mar & Oatley, 2008).
They have a beginning, middle, and end, and causality flows in a single
direction. If we can be informed directly about the future, that is a
better clue to how the story ends compared with what has already
happened in the past. Indeed, the future seems to be more psycholog-
ically “real” than the past. Future actions are seen as more intentional
and, if unethical, more morally wrong (Burns et al., 2012;
Caruso, 2010). People ask for greater compensation for future harms
(Caruso et al., 2008), future events evoke stronger affective reactions
(Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007), and the future feels “closer” than the
past (Caruso et al., 2013). According to CNT, forecasts are narrative
simulations (see also Beach & Mitchell, 1987). Such simulations can
use information about the past, but, if direct information about the
future is instead available, such information would be more readily
incorporated into simulations as its implications for the future have
already been “preprocessed.” We would therefore expect future-
oriented information to be weighed more heavily than past-oriented
information, even if equally (ir)relevant.
The narrative expectations hypothesis therefore makes two dis-
tinct predictions based on narrative structure. First, both positive and
negative trends should be projected into the future at all time hori-
zons. Thus, a positive (negative) performance surprise should lead to
predicted abnormal returns above (below) the market return at both
short and long time horizons. This is distinct from neoclassically ratio-
nal expectations, which would not use past performance surprises to
predict future returns, as well as from behaviorally informed expecta-
tions, which would predict trend continuation in the short term but
reversion to the market return in the long term. Second, the effect of
valence should be stronger when the news concerns predicted future
rather than actual past performance. That is, the predicted abnormal
returns induced by performance surprises should be amplified (more
positive or more negative), following future-oriented news. This pre-
diction cannot be motivated by neoclassically rational expectations,
and given the lack of evidence for such an effect in the behavioral
finance literature, it also appears to be inconsistent with behaviorally
informed expectations.
4 | SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS
We distinguish these theories of investor expectations across three
studies. Experiment 1 measures expectations directly, following cor-
porate performance surprises, measuring predicted stock prices at
shorter and longer intervals. The rational, behavioral, and narrative
expectations accounts make contrasting predictions about the
effects of news valence and time reference on these predictions.
Experiment 2 tests whether these predictions translate into
asset allocation choices that are biased by the standards of financial
theory, with potentially negative implications for the real-world
returns of amateur investors. Experiment 3 tests whether these
choices occur because positive performance surprises generate
approach emotions and negative performance surprises generate
avoidance emotions, with particularly strong emotional resonance
for future- rather than past-oriented news. In the Supplementary
Materials, we examine evidence concerning expertise effects, both
within the main studies and an additional sample with greater
expertise.
5 | EXPERIMENT 1
Participants in Experiment 1 learned and made judgments about the
stock prices of realistic, but fictitious, companies. For each company,
participants learned that an hour previous to the most recent price
quotation, an announcement was made by analysts concerning the
company's performance in either the past or future quarter, which was
either positive or negative. Participants were then asked to predict the
future trajectory of the price, at intervals of 1 day, 2 weeks, and
1 year.
As described earlier, neoclassical financial theory predicts that the
price should take a random walk after the initial adjustment following
the announcement. Thus, if people have neoclassically rational expec-
tations, they would predict that the price should rise at a rate consis-
tent with other securities, adjusted for the riskiness of the asset
(i.e., at the opportunity cost of capital). This is true at both short and
long time intervals because future news is unknown at the time of
prediction. Critically, there should be no difference between future
price predictions for positive or for negative performance surprises
(assuming the predictions are made after a short period is allowed for
the information to be priced in), nor for surprises about past versus
future performance.
If participants are more sophisticated and rely on a mental
model concordant with behavioral finance theories, then they may
predict modest post-announcement drift in the short term (i.e., a
more rapid price increase following a positive rather than negative
surprise) followed by a reversal of this trend in the longer term.
Thus, we would expect the divergence in price between positive
and negative surprises to decrease and be eliminated in the long
run (i.e., our 1-year horizon). As we are not aware of any economet-
ric work documenting divergences in price momentum between sur-
prises in past versus future performance, we do not believe that a
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behaviorally inclined participant would differentiate between these
conditions.
In contrast, because we hypothesize that people use narrative
thinking to make predictions, we anticipated that participants would
differentiate between positive and negative surprises and between
surprises in past and future performance.
5.1 | Method
5.1.1 | Participants
We recruited 225 American participants from the online
crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. This target sample
size was set a priori for all experiments and achieves 90% power for
within-subjects effects d > 0.20. For Experiment 1, 40 participants
were excluded from analysis due to inattentiveness (see below).
Participants were prevented from participating in multiple experi-
ments reported in this article.
Relative to student samples, the demographics of Mechanical
Turk are more appropriate for experiments in economic decision-
making because the participants come from a wider range of age, edu-
cation, and socioeconomic backgrounds. For Experiment 1, the sample
ranged in age from 19 to 71 (M = 37.8, SD = 11.4) and in education
from “did not complete high school” to “graduate degree”
(median = “some college”). About half (49%) of participants held some
financial assets (such as stocks, bonds, or mutual funds), and about
half (53%) had taken at least one finance course. About 14% of partic-
ipants majored in a business field, such as finance, management,
accounting, or economics. Thus, although Mechanical Turk partici-
pants are generally not expert investors, they reasonably represent
the investing experience of the American public, as about 52% of
Americans hold stocks (McCarthy, 2016) and about 19% of American
bachelor's degrees are awarded in business fields (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2016).
Clearly, this population is not nearly as experienced as profes-
sional traders. However, as many as half of our participants belong to
the category of low-information investors known as “noise traders” in
the finance literature (Shleifer & Summers, 1990). Financial models
turn greatly on the assumed behavior of these investors
(e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), so it is important to characterize these
investors' actual beliefs and behaviors. That said, Parts C and D in the
Supplementary Materials test for expertise effects, both within our
primary sample and in a sample of genuine experts.
Procedure
Each participant completed four items, each pertaining to a different
fictitious company—Remlon Software Corporation (RWQ), Wilfinger
Industries (WNV), Paravoz Exploration (PVZ), and Excellerate Con-
struction (XOL). Each company appeared in one of the four experi-
mental conditions (past/positive, future/positive, past/negative, and
future/negative), with the assignment of company to condition
counterbalanced using a Latin square.
For each company, participants first read background information
about the company and its current price. For example, one item read:
Remlon Software Corporation (stock symbol RWQ) is a
Dallas-based company that designs and markets busi-
ness software to medium- and large-size firms.
Here is the most recent price quotation for shares in
RWQ stock: $56.00.
Then, participants were asked to make baseline predictions about
the price trajectory of the shares (“Given that RWQ shares currently
trade at $56, please estimate what you think the share price will be
on the following dates”) at time horizons of “tomorrow,” “in two
weeks,” and “in in one year.” Ratings were made on a sliding scale
centered at the current price and ranging from 50% less than the cur-
rent price (e.g., $28 for RWQ) up to 50% more than the current price
($84 for RWQ). This measure was taken to understand participants'
expectations about the price trajectory of each stock in the absence
of performance data and to provide a comparison to news-induced
price predictions.
On the next screen, participants read a piece of news from
financial analysts concerning the security, which instantiated our
experimental manipulations of valence (positive or negative) and time
(past-oriented or future-oriented information). Critically, in both
conditions, the news information was said to have come out an hour
before the price quotation. Thus, market would have already incorpo-
rated this news into its valuations.
In the past condition, this information described past performance
relative to average (with the bracketed text varying across the positive
and negative conditions):
About an hour prior to the most recent price quotation
($56) for Remlon's stock (RWQ), the following piece of
news was revealed:
Although average sales growth is expected for the next
quarter, analysts determined that Remlon experienced
[above-average/below-average] levels of sales growth
over the past quarter.
Conversely, in the future condition, the information described
expected future performance relative to average:
About an hour prior to the most recent price quotation
($56) for Remlon's stock (RWQ), the following piece of
news was revealed:
Although average sales growth was observed for the
past quarter, analysts anticipate that Remlon will expe-
rience [above-average/below-average] levels of sales
growth over the next quarter.
The performance measures varied across the companies and
included sales growth (as above), as well as innovation, discoveries
of mineral deposits, and new contracts. The full text of the
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instructions and items is reported in Part A of the Supplementary
Materials.
Below this information, participants were asked to make a new
prediction: “Given that RWQ shares currently trade at $56, please
estimate again what you think the share price will be on the following
dates.” The time horizons and scale were the same as the baseline
prediction.
After the main task, participants answered a set of recognition
memory check questions (concerning the industries of the companies)
to monitor attentiveness. Any participants incorrectly answering more
than 30% of these questions were excluded from data analysis
(N = 40). However, Part B of the Supplementary Materials reports a
version of the analyses including all participants.
Finally, after answering demographic questions including mea-
sures of financial expertise, participants were debriefed, explaining
the purpose of the study and that the companies were fictitious.
5.2 | Results
For statistical analyses, we converted participants' price estimates into
percentage changes relative to the price quotation given in the prob-
lem, as shown in Table 1. Overall, the results largely confirm the pre-
dictions of the narrative account. Participants predicted much more
bullish price changes after a positive surprise, relative to baseline, and
much more bearish price changes after a negative surprise. For the
positive surprises, these predicted changes were larger in light of
future-oriented than for past-oriented performance information. Data
are available at https://osf.io/hy3w2/.
The analyses below rely on simple comparisons between key cells
for ease of presentation. In Part B of the Supplementary Materials, we
report hierarchical regression models for all experiments. These
models include robustness checks on sample exclusion criteria
(repeating key analyses on both the full sample and a subset that
excludes outliers) and using different specifications, such as including
baseline forecasts as a covariate and (for the 2-week and 1-year inter-
vals) including a lagged forecast variable (i.e., the 1-day and 2-week
forecast, respectively). For the valence effect, results are generally
robust to these analytical choices. For the time-reference effect,
results are less robust, with predicted effects showing up in some (but
typically not all) specifications in all three experiments.
5.2.1 | Baseline predictions
At the baseline, prior to reading any news, participants expected a
moderate price increase over 1-day (+1.7%), 2-week (+4.3%), and
1-year (+8.7%) time horizons. Although the 1-day and 2-week predic-
tions are optimistic, the 1-year prediction is consistent with historical
returns (e.g., about a 10% nominal increase annually for the S&P 500).
The variance in predictions increased at longer time intervals, in both
the baseline and experimental conditions. This may reflect the greater
uncertainty at long horizons about either specific firms or general
market conditions. As shown in Part B of the Supplementary Mate-
rials, baseline forecasts are strongly predictive of forecasts in all con-
ditions. However, models that include and exclude this variable tend
to result in similar estimates of the valence and time-reference
effects.
5.2.2 | Valence of news
Because the news information given was from before the most recent
price quotation, predictions about future prices should not depend on
whether the news was positive or negative. Yet, Table 1 shows that
predictions markedly differed depending on the news valence.
Looking at the positive surprise items collapsed across time con-
ditions, participants predicted increases of +6.0% at a 1-day, +10.3%
at a 2-week, and +16.1% at a 1-year timeframe. These predictions
were significantly more positive than the baseline predictions
(ts > 8.9, ps < .001, ds > 0.61), in violation of market efficiency. Strik-
ingly, the divergences between the baseline and the positive surprise
predictions were largest at longer time intervals. That is, the perfor-
mance surprise led to a predicted premium of +4.3% at 1 day and
+6.0% at 2 weeks, with the latter premium significantly larger (t(184)
= 5.28, p < .001, d = 0.25), with a yet larger premium of +7.4% at
1 year (t(184) = 2.92, p = .004, d = 0.15). In other words, the alleged
predictive signal associated with the news announcement actually
grew larger rather than smaller over longer timeframes. Thus, partici-
pants predicted strong price momentum, with investors underreacting
to news—a belief at least qualitatively consistent with empirical stud-
ies of asset prices. However, whereas in reality these trends reverse
in the longer run, participants predicted an ever-increasing effect of
positive news.
TABLE 1 Results of Experiment 1
Time horizon Baseline
Positive surprise Negative surprise
Past Future Past Future
1 day 1.7% (2.6%) 5.5% (7.8%) 6.5% (7.7%) −2.7% (6.7%) −2.9% (7.5%)
2 weeks 4.3% (4.9%) 9.3% (9.6%) 11.2% (9.0%) −4.6% (7.9%) −4.4% (8.6%)
1 year 8.7% (9.9%) 14.7% (15.4%) 17.5% (15.4%) −5.7% (12.8%) −6.1% (14.1%)
Number of observations = 185
Notes: Entries are predicted changes from current value as percentages. Possible scores range from −50% to +50%. The baseline column gives the mean of
the baseline estimates made across the four within-subjects conditions, as these estimates were made prior to the manipulation. SDs in parentheses.
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The story was similar for negative surprises, but even more dra-
matic (in line with other asymmetries between positive and negative
events; e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001). Collapsing across time condi-
tions, participants predicted decreases of −2.8% at 1-day, −4.5% at
2-week, and −5.9% at 1-year timeframes. Needless to say, these pre-
dictions diverged sharply from the baseline (ts > 9.2, ps < .001,
ds > 0.93) as well as from the positive surprise condition (ts > 10.4,
ps < .001, ds > 1.3). And once again, the predicted shortfall relative to
baseline increased at longer time horizons, with a shortfall of −4.5%
at 1 day versus −8.8% at 2 weeks (t(184) = 9.50, p < .001, d = 0.54)
and an even larger shortfall of −14.6% at 1 year (t(184) = 8.68,
p < .001, d = 0.48). Again, participants predicted both short- and long-
term momentum, rather than long-term reversion as has been found
empirically.
5.2.3 | Time reference of news
Though not as strong as the effect of valence, participants often took
account of the time reference of news inconsistently with financial
theory. Predictions tended to be more extreme (i.e., positive in light
of positive news and negative in light of negative news) given
future-oriented information compared with past-oriented information.
Collapsing across valence, future-oriented predictions were 0.6%
more extreme at a 1-day horizon (t(184) = 1.84, p = .066, d = 0.14
vs. 0% in a one-sample test), 0.8% more extreme at a 2-week horizon
(t(184) = 2.29, p = .023, d = 0.17), and 1.6% more extreme at a 1-year
time horizon (t(184) = 2.50, p = .013, d = 0.18). Thus, overall our
prediction was supported that future-oriented information would be
weighted more heavily than past-oriented information due to the
inherently temporal nature of narrative thinking.
However, these effects were not symmetric across valences, but
were instead driven by the positive valence conditions. For positive
news, there was a substantial effect of time reference at all horizons
(1.0%, 1.9%, and 2.8%), whereas there was no significant effect at any
horizon for the negative valence items (0.2%, −0.2%, and 0.4%). It is
unclear what accounts for this asymmetry, which was not observed in
subsequent experiments. One possibility is that participants were hes-
itant to predict more negative price changes than −6% in light of
information that is only moderately negative, especially given that the
stock market was quite bullish at the time of the experiment
(March 2017). That is, our manipulation may have run into a tacit
floor. If this is the case, then more extreme negative events could
potentially lead to a time-reference asymmetry. Rather than pursuing
this approach, however, subsequent experiments turn instead to
alternate dependent measures.
Parts C and D of the Supplementary Materials examine the
effects of expertise. Such effects appear to be modest. Within the
range of expertise in our experiments, we find that investing experi-
ence seems to modestly decrease (but not eliminate) the effects,
whereas self-reported investing knowledge seems, if anything, to exac-
erbate them (Part C), with these findings reasonably consistent across
Experiments 1–3 but nonetheless exploratory. We also conducted a
near-exact replication of Experiment 1 on a sample of individuals with
greater expertise—professional financial analysts, PhD students in
economics, and Masters students in finance (Part D). That study rev-
ealed nearly identical findings, suggesting that even the intuitions of
experts such as investment professionals may differ little from those
of our nonexpert participants. Thus, although market experience may
well attenuate some behavioral biases (e.g., List, 2003), there is little
evidence that the narrative effects we see here are eliminated by
expertise.
5.3 | Discussion
These results support the idea that people rely on narratives when
predicting the price trajectories of financial assets. Whereas partici-
pants with neoclassically rational expectations would predict increases
in asset prices at the market rate of return, our participants sharply
differentiated between positive and negative performance surprises,
predicting dramatically superior growth in light of a positive rather
than negative piece of news. This was the case even though the
predicted price changes were made relative to the price after the
news announcement. Instead, news information appears to trigger
narratives in investors' minds. Because narratives are temporally
extended, they can be used to make predictions about the future. The
effect of news valence was not symmetric relative to the baseline pre-
dictions, with negative news exerting a larger effect than positive
news. This is in line with well-documented negativity biases in many
domains (Baumeister et al., 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979),
although negativity biases are not always seen in forecasting tasks
(Fildes et al., 2019).
In addition, there was some evidence that participants differenti-
ated between news concerning the past versus the future—a finding
that appears at odds with both neoclassically rational and behaviorally
informed expectations. Positive surprises about past performance
were seen as less positive than surprises about expected future per-
formance, although the corresponding effect for negative surprises
did not reach significance in this experiment. If people think about
financial assets like economists—who recognize that it is expectations
about the future that matter, which are quickly priced in to asset
prices, whether new information concerns the past or the future—
then the temporal direction of performance surprises should not mat-
ter. But if people use news information as raw material for con-
structing narratives about the company, then information about the
future would indeed be more diagnostic about the company's future
than information about the past.
Could these results be reconciled with neoclassical financial the-
ory on the basis of participants' inferences about risk? According to
financial models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM;
Fama & French, 2004; Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964) and its succes-
sors, investors prefer, for a given rate of return, securities with lower
variance around that expectation. That is, investors are risk-averse.
According to this logic, investors will require a larger expected return
to invest in a riskier security, and participants' tendency to predict
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higher returns for some securities would be consistent with main-
stream theory if due to inferences about risk.
However, this explanation is not workable. For the risk-inference
account to hold, people would need to believe that securities with
positive performance surprises are riskier (having greater variance)
than those with negative performance surprises. Further, the magni-
tude of the difference between the positive and negative surprises
(of greater than 20% at a 1-year horizon) is empirically implausible as
a risk premium. It is more plausible that participants would believe
future information to be more risk-inducing than past information
(justifying the higher expected return for positive future compared
with past surprises). However, the risk account would also predict that
future negative performance surprises should lead to stronger future
returns compared with past negative surprises. The means generally
went in the opposite direction (albeit nonsignificantly), and we will see
a significant effect in the opposite direction in Experiment 2. Thus,
inferences about risk are unlikely to account for participants' diver-
gent predictions based on the valence and time reference of news
information.
The results also conflict with behaviorally informed expectations.
Investors with such expectations would predict short-term price
momentum, followed by longer term reversals. Our participants
diverged from this pattern in three ways. First, their short-term
momentum was overzealous compared with the econometric findings
(Bernard & Thomas, 1989, 1990). Second, rather than reverting back
toward the market return in the longer term, participants' predictions
were precisely the opposite, diverging increasingly at longer horizons.
Finally, we are not aware of any behavioral work that would predict a
difference in predictions or choices based on the time reference of
company news, so it is unclear how the behavioral account would
explain the time-reference effect.
We also can consider several alternative explanations. First, per-
haps most participants simply are not aware of the idea that known
news is incorporated into current prices (explaining the valence asym-
metry) and this ignorance is more common for future-oriented news
(explaining the temporal asymmetry). One prediction made by this
account is that the effects should disappear for those participants
who are especially knowledgeable. However, as noted above and
explored in Parts C and D of the Supplementary Materials, this was
not the case.
Second, several researchers have raised concerns about demon-
strations of irrationality that require participants to interpret and
accept statements made by the experimenters (Hilton, 1995). For
example, framing effects sometimes depend on inferences made
about the implicit recommendations of the speaker (Sher &
McKenzie, 2006), whereas the conjunction fallacy appears to depend
in part on inferences about ambiguous terms such as “probability”
(Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). In our studies, the pre-
dictions of rational expectations particularly depend on participants'
accepting that the news was publicly announced 1 h prior to the price
quotation—perhaps they do not. Related, participants might experi-
ence demand characteristics, feeling the need to differentiate
between conditions based on a desire to use the given information.
Although we cannot rule these out as contributing factors, they
cannot be the whole story. These explanations seem to predict a dif-
ference in the first period, but do not make clear predictions about
what specific pattern we will see in later periods, and in particular do
not distinctly predict the narrative expectations pattern (differences
between conditions get larger at later periods) versus behaviorally
informed expectations pattern (differences get smaller at later
periods). Moreover, it is unclear how these factors would explain the
time-reference effect. At the same time, we are sympathetic to
aspects of these accounts, particularly the idea that participants make
intelligent inferences about speakers' intentions. Indeed, such conver-
sational inferences may contribute to the adoption of narratives.
Finally, perhaps the time-reference effect is due to confounding
past/future with objective/subjective information, because the future,
unlike the past, is inherently unknowable. Although we acknowledge
that this confound exists, it actually seems to push in the opposite
direction of our results—people should rely less on subjective than on
objective information, yet people tend to rely more on future- rather
than past-oriented information.
6 | EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 sought to extend the findings to a new measure—
choice. After once again learning about positive or negative surprises
in past or future performance, participants rated the likelihood that
they would include the security in a portfolio they were constructing.
Because accurate predictions of price growth represent profit oppor-
tunities, participants should prefer to hold securities that they expect
to increase in value. Based on Experiment 1, we therefore predicted
(a) a preference to hold securities with a positive rather than negative
performance surprise and (b) a more extreme preference when the
surprise concerned expected future performance rather than actual
past performance.
6.1 | Method
We recruited 225 Americans from Mechanical Turk, excluding
51 using the same criterion as Experiment 1. However, the results are
similar if these participants are included in the analyses.
The method was similar to Experiment 1. Participants made judg-
ments about four companies, which faced either positive or negative
surprises concerning their past or future performance. Relative to
Experiment 1, we introduced two changes. First, participants were
asked to make a portfolio allocation choice rather than a prediction
about future value. Participants were asked to “Suppose that you are
creating a portfolio of securities. Given that RWQ shares currently
trade at $56, please rate the probability that you would include RWQ
shares in your portfolio.” These ratings were made on a scale from 0%
to 100%. Second, where participants in Experiment 1 made predic-
tions both before and after reading the news information, allocation
choices were only made once in Experiment 2, after reading the news
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information. This change was made to avoid potential demand charac-
teristics associated with asking for two ratings, which could be a pos-
sible concern about Experiment 1.
6.2 | Results and discussion
As shown in Table 2, the results replicate both the valence and the
temporal asymmetries found in Experiment 1.
Looking first at valence, we collapse across the past and future
conditions within each valence condition, reporting on average a
64.4% chance of including a security in their portfolio if it had experi-
enced a positive performance surprise and a 26.4% chance if it had
experienced a negative performance surprise. These judgments, obvi-
ously, differed significantly from one another (t(173) = 20.35,
p < .001, d = 2.02). Thus, the effect of valence translates into portfolio
allocation choices.
This effect was moderated by the time reference of the news.
Like Experiment 1, allocation choices were 5.4% more extreme
(collapsing across valence) when the news was future- rather than
past-oriented (t(173) = 4.50, p < .001, d = 0.34 vs. 0% in a one-sample
test). Unlike Experiment 1, however, this effect was driven by both
the positive and negative conditions. When the news was positive,
participants were 4.2% more likely to invest if the news was future-
rather than past-oriented (t(173) = 2.65, p = .009, d = 0.20), and when
the news was negative, participants were 6.6% less likely to invest if
the news was future- rather than past-oriented (t(173) = 4.45,
p < .001, d = 0.34).
7 | EXPERIMENT 3
What psychological mechanisms underpin the relationship between
narrative thinking and choice? On the one hand, Experiment 1 demon-
strated that predictions are driven in part by narrative thinking, and it
is no surprise that participants' beliefs about the future translate into
patterns of choices. In addition to this cognitive process, however, we
note that both narratives and choices are often tinged with emotion.
The most prototypical examples of narratives in our culture are novels
and films that are enjoyable precisely because they evoke emotions. A
related literature on explanatory reasoning has argued that people
accept explanations in part because they “feel” satisfying
(Gopnik, 1998; Johnson, 2017; Lipton, 2004), even in such abstract
domains as mathematics (Johnson & Steinerberger, 2019). On the
choice side, we are likelier to make choices that maximize approach
emotions and minimize avoidance emotions (Carver, 2006). Emotions
are critical metacognitive cues that help us to mediate between cogni-
tion and action, aiding us in planning and typically guiding us toward
adaptive choices (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1986). However, they can
also become untethered from more rational cognitive appraisals and
lead to mistakes (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
More specifically, we propose that people hold emotion-tinged
attitudes toward specific objects, such as financial securities, and that
these emotions are influenced by the role of that object in the
person's narrative (Bilovich et al., 2020; Johnson, Bilovich, & Tuckett,
2020). If the narrative predicts a positive outcome for a security, this
generates approach emotions, which lead people to purchase the
security. Conversely, if the narrative predicts a negative outcome for
the security, this generates avoidance emotions, leading people to sell
the security.
Experiment 3 tests the idea that emotional processes mediate the
relationship between performance surprise information and choices
for both the effect of valence and of time reference. That is, we
expected that people would feel more positive; approach emotions in
light of positive surprises, leading to choices to invest in those securi-
ties; and feel more negative, avoidance emotions in light of negative
surprises, leading to choices to avoid those securities. Further, we
expected that this affective gap would be larger when the surprises
were future- rather than past-oriented and that this larger affective
gap would lead to a larger gap in choice.
7.1 | Method
We recruited 225 Americans from Mechanical Turk, excluding
45 using the same criterion as previous experiments.
The method was similar to Experiment 2, with two changes. First,
we introduced a measure of participants' emotions for each item. On
the same screen as the news information, participants were asked to
“Suppose you held shares in Remlon Software Corporation (RWQ).
How would the above information make you feel? Please check all
that apply.” Participants then checked items from a list of 20 avoid-
ance emotions (e.g., “distrustful,” “threatened,” and “worried”) and
20 approach emotions (e.g., “confident”, “passionate,” and “satisfied”),
which were listed in a new random order for each item. Second, the
choice measure was moved to a separate page to avoid explicitly
reminding the participants which emotions they checked.
7.2 | Results
Participants were likelier to include securities in their portfolios after a
positive rather than negative surprise, as shown in Table 3, and once
again, this trend was exaggerated when the surprises concerned
future rather than past performance. Going beyond Experiment
TABLE 2 Results of Experiment 2
Negative surprise Positive surprise
Past Future Past Future
29.7% (22.4%) 23.1% (18.0%) 62.3% (21.7%) 66.5% (22.9%)
Number of Observations = 174
Notes: Entries are probability judgments that the security would be
invested in the participant's portfolio. Possible scores range from 0% to
100%. SDs in parentheses.
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2, however, we find that these effects of valence and time reference
are mediated by emotions.
Given that our hypotheses are described in terms of mediation,
our statistical analyses are organized around mediation tests. Because
the manipulations were within subjects, we followed the procedure of
Judd et al. (2001), as implemented in the MEMORE macro for SPSS
(Montoya & Hayes, 2017) using the percentile bootstrap method for
computing confidence intervals.1
7.2.1 | Emotion as a mediator of the valence effect
We first examine the effect of valence on emotion and choice.
Because the design was within subjects, the mediator and outcome
variables each have two levels (i.e., the positive and negative surprise
conditions). The outcome variables were the mean propensity to
include the security in the participant's portfolio, collapsing across the
past and future conditions, separately for positive and negative sur-
prises. The emotion mediator variable was a net emotion score
(approach minus avoidance emotions), collapsing again across time
reference condition, separately for positive and negative surprises.
The mediator variables thus could potentially range from −20 to +20,
with higher numbers indicating a preponderance of approach over
avoidance emotions.
As shown in Figure 1, there was a significant total effect of
valence on choice, 95% CI(33.42,40.69), p < .001. That is, replicating
Experiment 2, people were likelier to include assets in their portfolio
following a positive rather than negative surprise. The bootstrapping
procedure revealed that this effect has both a mediated component
via emotion, 95% CI(8.38,18.90), p < .001, and an unmediated, direct
component, 95% CI(17.75,29.54), p < .001. Because there were signif-
icant indirect (mediated) and direct (unmediated) paths, we conclude
that the effect of valence on choice is partially mediated by emotion.
Given that the mediation was partial, other (perhaps cognitive) mecha-
nisms are also likely to be at play in explaining this effect.
7.2.2 | Emotion as a mediator of the time-
reference effect
We next examine the effect of time reference on emotion and choice.
For these analyses, the mediator and outcome variables were the dif-
ferences between net emotion and choice across the two time-
reference conditions (future minus past), separately for positive and
negative surprises. Thus, these scores should be positive for the posi-
tive surprises, because future-oriented positive news (relative to past-
oriented positive news) should lead to a stronger preponderance of
approach over avoidance emotions and a greater choice propensity,
whereas future-oriented negative news should lead to the opposite
pattern. The mediation analysis allows us to test whether these time-
reference-induced differences in emotion lead to the time-reference-
induced differences in choice.
TABLE 3 Results of Experiment 3
Negative surprise Positive surprise
Past Future Past Future
Avoidance emotions 5.6 (3.9) 6.0 (4.1) 0.8 (5.2) 0.7 (5.3)
Approach emotions 0.3 (1.3) 0.2 (0.6) 5.2 (3.9) 5.3 (4.0)
Choices 30.8% (20.1%) 29.6% (21.0%) 66.1% (19.5%) 68.3% (19.7%)
Number of observations = 180
Notes: The first two rows indicate the mean number of negative and positive emotion words (each out of
20) checked in each condition. The third row shows probability judgments that the security would be
invested in the participant's portfolio (from 0% to 100%). SDs in parentheses.
F IGURE 1 Mediation of valence effect on choice by affect. The c
coefficient reflects the total effect of valence on choice, measured by
the difference in choice between positive and negative surprises. The
indirect effect is equal to the product of the a and b coefficients,
whereas the direct effect c0 is the remaining effect of valence on
choice after accounting for the indirect effect. Coefficients are
unstandardized (SEs in parentheses)
F IGURE 2 Mediation of time-reference effect on choice by
affect. The c coefficient reflects the total effect of valence on time-
reference-induced differences in choice (future minus past), measured
by the difference in time-reference difference scores between
positive and negative surprises. The indirect effect is equal to the
product of the a and b coefficients, whereas the direct effect c0 is the
remaining effect of valence on choice after accounting for the indirect
effect. Coefficients are unstandardized (SEs in parentheses)
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Figure 2 reveals a significant total effect of valence on the time-
reference asymmetry (i.e., future − past difference scores) in choice,
95% CI(0.32,6.53), p = .031. This replicates the effect of time refer-
ence on choice in Experiment 2. Given that the time-reference effect
was of smaller magnitude than the valence effect, however, the model
was less well powered to distinguish between the indirect (mediated)
and direct (unmediated) effects of valence on time reference. Both
the indirect and direct effects were marginal, 95% CI(−0.26,2.14),
p = .108 and 95% CI(−0.34,5.34), p = .085, respectively. Given the sig-
nificant total effect and marginal partial effects, we suspect that, as
with the effect of valence, both the direct and indirect paths are in
operation.
7.3 | Discussion
These results broadly support our predictions. First, we directly repli-
cated the effects of valence and time reference on choice that were
found in Experiment 2. Second, we demonstrated these effects on yet
another dependent measure—the preponderance of approach over
avoidance emotions. Finally, we showed these effects on emotion
partially mediate the downstream effects on choice. Thus, these
effects appear to have both cognitive and affective components, con-
sistent with the idea that people construct narratives about financial
securities (a largely cognitive process) and use those narratives to
inform their choices (a process likely to be tinged with emotion).
8 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
People are natural storytellers. Do these narrative instincts help peo-
ple to make sense of financial data and to make economic choices?
Three studies suggest an affirmative answer. Contradicting the predic-
tions of rational expectations theory, people predict much higher
increases in share prices after positive rather than negative news
(Experiment 1). Even though in reality such trends are small and
reverse over time, participants actually believed that these trends
would grow larger at longer time intervals. These differences were
larger when information concerned predictions about the future
rather than facts about the past, suggesting that people impose tem-
poral order on news information. These effects of news valence and
time reference had downstream consequences for portfolio allocation
choices (Experiment 2) and were driven partly by affect (Experiment
3). Parts C and D pf of the Supplementary Materials revealed that any
effects of expertise are modest.
These studies are not, of course, without limitations. First, per-
formance was not financially incentivized, suggesting some caution
about generalizing these results to real-world behavior. Ameliorating
the issue somewhat, we would point to evidence that incentives
often do surprisingly little to eliminate decision-making biases,
sometimes even exacerbating biases and rarely eliminating them
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Second, the information given to partic-
ipants was impoverished relative to many real-world contexts, which
typically provide, among other things, time-series information. This
is useful for dissecting theory, but it is possible that these effects
differ in richer information environments. Replicating these studies
in a real-time, interactive trading environment with financial incen-
tives would be a valuable contribution to experimental finance.
Future research might also examine the interactive effect of time-
series and news data, which have usually been studied separately in
experiments.
Neoclassical microfoundations for economic behavior, such as
rational expectations, have difficulty accounting for our results. Fur-
ther, they appear to fall outside the scope of existing behavioral deci-
sion theories, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Although prospect theory and its extensions capture much about
human behavior in contexts where possibilities are enumerable and
their probabilities are known (such as gambles), they have less to say
about situations of Knightian uncertainty in which such probabilities
are elusive. These results support the idea that in such situations, peo-
ple use narratives as their primary tool for making sense of informa-
tion and making choices leading to action. This position is known as
CNT (Chong & Tuckett, 2014; Johnson et al., 2020; Tuckett &
Nikolic, 2017).
According to CNT, individuals faced with Knightian uncertainty
marshal available information to form a narrative—a causally and tem-
porally structured mental representation that explains this informa-
tion, generates predictions about the future, and motivates action. To
construct these explanatory narratives, people draw upon prior beliefs
and lay theories (e.g., Furnham, 1988), causal reasoning abilities
(e.g., Lombrozo, 2016; Sloman, 2005), and trusted sources
(e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Mills, 2013; Sperber et al., 2010).
Because narratives are causally and temporally extended, they can be
projected forward to imagine future events (Beach & Mitchell, 1987).
And because narratives are affectively rich, they can generate
approach and avoidance motivations that allow an individual to build
sufficient conviction to maintain a sustained decision over time. Inter-
view studies of professional money managers support these ideas
(Tuckett, 2011), and we believe these processes capture the phenom-
enology of choice under Knightian uncertainty. Moreover, text-mining
studies find that the preponderance of positive over negative emotion
words in sources such as central bank documents can predict macro-
economic variables such as industrial production and GDP (Nyman
et al., 2018).
However, both qualitative and econometric methods are less use-
ful for establishing rigorous causal evidence about the mental pro-
cesses that underlie these effects, limiting their use for testing
theories of microfoundations. The current studies add to our ongoing
efforts to experimentally test these microfoundations. When
predicting the future value of a stock under uncertain states of the
world, investors tend to focus on a single possible state and act as
though it is certain—choosing a narrative and sticking with it
(Johnson & Hill, 2017). Investors are sensitive to the explanations
offered by managers and analysts for changes in share prices and
earnings, suggesting that these explanations can offer the raw mate-
rial for making narrative projections (Johnson, Matiashvili, &
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Tuckett, 2019b). Other work has begun to examine how people evalu-
ate competing narratives. For example, rather than naively extrapolat-
ing past price changes into the future when forming price
expectations, people use sophisticated techniques (albeit erroneous,
from the perspective of financial theory) to match past price patterns
to future predictions (Johnson, Matiashvili, & Tuckett, 2019a). Our
work on the interplay between narratives, confidence, and emotions
suggests that narratives direct attention to particular information,
which influences our confidence and in turn our emotions (Bilovich
et al., 2020). Finally, social influence plays a crucial role, as people use
seemingly irrelevant cues, such as an expert's moral and political
values, to assess which financial advisor to trust (Johnson,
Rodrigues, & Tuckett, 2020). This may be one important link in under-
standing why particular stories “go viral” in particular social groups
(Shiller, 2017). The current work adds yet further evidence to this
growing empirical case in favor of CNT.
Beyond this mounting empirical case, we might consider the
theoretical merits and demerits of CNT. One merit, compared with
the rational and behaviorally informed expectations accounts as well
as with existing notions about causation in the forecasting literature,
is that CNT accounts for how the relevant mental models got into
people's heads (Szollosi & Newell, 2020). As a psychological theory,
it provides greater detail about mental representations and pro-
cesses and provides a stronger bridge to other known facts about
the mind. On the other hand, its psychological realism can also be a
weakness, when taken as an economic model, in that one might rea-
sonably critique CNT for being insufficiently constrained. This is of
course a common critique of behavioral approaches by more classi-
cally oriented economists—mainstream economics provides a strik-
ingly unified approach, whereas behavioral approaches are often
haphazard, documenting particular anomalies in a comparatively
unsystematic fashion. Indeed, we accept that CNT is unlikely to
achieve the precision of neoclassical models. Yet, we think that
CNT's links with basic psychological mechanisms strike a good bal-
ance between systematic theory and integrity to the real world. We
expect that further advances, both theoretical and empirical, will
allow our understanding of forecasting and decision-making to
advance on both fronts.
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ENDNOTE
1 This procedure is a path-analytic formulation of Judd et al.'s (2001) pro-
cedure for within-subjects mediation tests. This procedure estimates the
effects in the following way. The total effect c of the independent vari-
able (X) on the outcome variable (Y) is estimated by conducting a paired
t-test comparing the two levels of Y (equivalently, regressing the differ-
ence between levels of Y on an intercept term). The effect a of X on the
mediator (M) is estimated by conducting a paired t-test comparing the
two levels of M (equivalently, regressing the difference between levels
of M on an intercept term). The effect b of M on Y is estimated by
regressing Y on M. The direct (unmediated) effect c0 of X on Y is esti-
mated by regressing Y on X and adjusting for the effect of the mediator.
The indirect effect of X on Y via M is equal to ab, or equivalently c–c0.
The distribution of ab is estimated using bootstrapping, allowing for con-
fidence intervals and significance tests. We estimated p-values for the
tests of indirect effects by calculating the proportion of bootstrap sam-
ples for which the indirect effect estimate was not positive and doubling
this proportion (to create a two-tailed test).
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